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STANDARD OF INTENT FOR TRUE 
THREAT CONVICTIONS 
PETER S. LARSON 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”1 Even though the Supreme 
Court has held many regulations of speech constitutional, those laws 
regulating the content of speech garner the strictest standard of 
constitutional scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that 
Congress can regulate certain categories of speech based on content.2 
One such category is “true threats” of physical violence, first 
delineated in Watts v. United States.3 In 1939, Congress in-part 
regulated true threats with 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Now, in Elonis v. United 
States,4 the Court must decide exactly what speech constitutes a “true 
threat.” Must the speaker have subjectively intended to threaten 
another person? Or is it enough that a reasonable speaker would 
have foreseen someone interpreting the speech as a threat? 
Elonis is a ground-breaking case. Not only does it mark the first 
time the Court will consider limits for speech on social media,5 but it 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . . 
the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited 
areas.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992))). 
 3.  394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
 4.  No. 13-983 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2014). 
 5.  Emily Bazelon, Do Online Death Threats Count as Free Speech?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/do-online-death-threats-count-as-free-
speech.html. 
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is the Court’s first examination of true-threat jurisprudence since 
2003’s Virginia v. Black.6 In Black, the Court did not decide whether a 
“true threat” required that the speaker subjectively intend to threaten 
the listener. Elonis places this question directly before the Court. 
This commentary will relate the factual background of the case, 
including the speech that was the basis for Anthony Elonis’s 
indictment. Then it will examine the Supreme Court’s protected-
speech precedent and its true-threat jurisprudence in particular as 
well as the Third Circuit’s holding in the case below. It then highlights 
each side’s arguments for why the statute and the First Amendment 
do or do not compel courts to use a subjective-intent standard. After 
analyzing those arguments in light of Watts and Black it concludes 
that the Court will likely reverse the Third Circuit’s decision and hold 
that a finding of subjective intent is required. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In May 2010, Anthony Elonis’s wife of seven years left him, taking 
their two kids with her.7 The following October, Elonis was fired from 
his job at Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom, an amusement park in 
Allentown, Pennsylvania, because of a photograph he had posted on 
Facebook taken during his office’s Halloween party.8 The photo 
showed Elonis in a costume, holding a knife to a coworker’s throat 
with the caption, “I wish.”9 His boss saw the post and fired him that 
same day.10 
Two days after he was fired, Elonis took to Facebook. He first 
posted about his former employer, Dorney Park,11 imagining the fear 
his former coworkers must feel not knowing whether he still had keys 
to the gates.12 He also posted about his estranged wife: “[i]f I only 
knew then what I know now, I would have smothered your ass with a 
pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, dropped you off in Toad 
Creek, and made it look like a rape and murder.”13 He posted more 
about his wife in comments on her sister’s status updates.14 For 
 
 6. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 7.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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example, when his wife’s sister posted about going Halloween 
costume shopping with his children, Elonis commented, “Tell [my son] 
he should dress up as matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his 
costume would entail though. Maybe [my wife’s] head on a stick?”15 
He also posted in October 2010:16 
There’s one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m 
not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and 
dying from all the little cuts. Hurry up and die, bitch, so I can bust 
this nut all over your corpse from atop your shallow grave. I used 
to be a nice guy but then you became a slut. Guess it’s not your 
fault you liked your daddy raped you. So hurry up and die, bitch, 
so I can forgive you.17 
As a result of these statements, a state court issued Elonis’s wife a 
restraining order against him on November 4, 2010.18 In response, 
Elonis posted again on November 7, this time an adaptation of the 
Whitest Kids U’ Know sketch “It’s Illegal to Say. . .”:19 
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? 
It’s illegal. 
It’s indirect criminal contempt. 
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say. 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just 
telling you that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife. 
I’m not actually saying it. 
I’m just letting you know that it’s illegal for me to say that. 
It’s kind of like a public service. 
I’m letting you know so that you don’t accidently go out and say 
something like that. 
Um, what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really 
think someone out there should kill my wife. 
That’s illegal. 
Very, very illegal. 
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher. 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See Whitest Kids U’ Know: I Want to Kill the President (Fuse broadcast Apr. 24, 2007), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEQOvyGbBtY.  
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Because that’s its own sentence. 
It’s an incomplete sentence but it may have nothing to do with the 
sentence before that. So that’s perfectly fine. 
Perfectly legal. 
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal, to go 
on Facebook and say something like the best place to fire a mortar 
launcher at her house would be from the cornfield behind it 
because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a clear 
line of sight through the sun room. 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely illegal. 
Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated diagram. 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, horribly felonious. 
Cause they will come to my house in the middle of the night and 
they will lock me up. 
Extremely against the law. 
Uh, one thing that is technically legal to say is that we have a 
group that meets Fridays at my parent’s house and the password is 
sic simper tyrannis.20 
And on November 15, Elonis posted threats to both his wife and 
to local law enforcement on Facebook:21 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first place 
Me thinks the judge needs an education on true threat 
jurisprudence 
 
 20.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324–25. 
 21.  Id. at 325–26. 
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And prison time will add zeroes to my settlement 
Which you won’t see a lick 
Because you suck dog dick in front of children 
*** 
And if worse comes to worse 
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the state police and the 
sheriff’s department 
[]link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org[]22 
Elonis’s November 16 Facebook post was the basis of Count Four, 
threats to a kindergarten class:23 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for myself 
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most 
heinous school shooting ever imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class 
The only question is . . . which one?24 
After monitoring Elonis’s public Facebook posts, FBI agents went 
to his house to interview him, but Elonis closed the door on them 
once they had identified themselves and confirmed that he was “free 
to go.”25 He then returned to Facebook and posted the following, 
which became the basis for Count Five, threats to an FBI agent:26 
You know your shit’s ridiculous when you have the FBI knockin’ 
at yo’ door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat 
Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner 
[laughter] 
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at it 
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 326. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes 
on? 
I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all goin’ 
[BOOM!]27 
Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010.28 The grand jury 
indicted him on five counts of making threatening communications in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).29 His pre-trial motion to dismiss the 
indictment was denied.30 At trial, a jury acquitted Elonis on Count 
One, threatening the patrons and employees of Dorney Park, but 
convicted him on Counts Two through Five: threatening his wife, the 
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and Berks County 
Sheriff’s Department, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent.31 The 
court then sentenced him to forty-four months in prison, followed by 
three years of supervised release.32 His post-trial motions were denied 
and he appealed his conviction to the Third Circuit.33 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Interstate Communications 
Elonis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which provides 
“[w]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any 
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”34 The statute was  
enacted in 193935 in the wake of laws aimed at extortion in kidnapping 
cases.36 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 327. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 2014). 
 35.  Pub. L. No. 76-76, 53 Stat. 742 (1939). 
 36.  See, e.g., Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-274, 47 Stat. 649, codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 
876 (West 2014). 
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B.  Reading in a Mens Rea Requirement 
Mens rea is Latin for “guilty mind.”37 The mens rea requirement is 
fundamental in criminal law. It takes the form of the varying intent 
requirements, such as intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, 
which a legislature may attach to conduct it proscribes. Even where a 
statute does not specify a mens rea element, the rule is for courts to 
nonetheless presume “that some form of scienter is to be implied,” 
absent a clear instruction from Congress to the contrary.38 At trial, the 
prosecution is responsible for proving the relevant intent requirement 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court has explained that another presumption “requires a 
court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to 
separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”39 
Secondly, Congress is presumed to act purposefully when it uses 
particular language in one section of an Act but omits it from 
another.40  
Section 875(c) does not include a subjective-intent requirement. 
One of its predecessors dealing with demands for ransom, however, 
18 U.S.C. § 876 required finding “intent to extort.”41 This raises the 
question of whether Congress meant to depart from the subjective-
intent requirement it used in § 876, or whether it merely no longer felt 
it necessary to include these exact words. 
C.  Unprotected Speech 
The Supreme Court has historically understood the First 
Amendment to prohibit content-based restrictions on speech.42 The 
reasoning for the presumption is the first-principles notion “that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”43 
 
 37.  9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1989). 
 38.  United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994). 
 39.  Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 256–57 (2000) (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 
U.S. at 72). 
 40.  See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
 41.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 876(b) (West 2014) (“Whoever, with intent to extort from any 
person any money or other thing of value, so deposits . . . any communication containing any 
threat to kidnap any person . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
twenty years, or both.”). 
 42.  See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 652, 660 (2004) (holding that the government bears 
the burden of showing the constitutionality of content-based restrictions on speech). 
 43.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
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However, as cherished a refrain of liberty as the First Amendment 
is, the right has always been qualified.44 Among the legitimate 
purposes for which the Court has permitted restricting speech based 
on content is “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from 
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.”45 The common law carved out 
exceptions for such content-based restrictions as obscenity, 
defamation, and incitement,46 and the Court endorsed those 
exceptions with a few of its more famous one-liners, including Justice 
Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” regarding obscenity47 and Justice 
Holmes’s “falsely shouting fire in a theater” regarding incitement.48 
In Watts v. United States, the Court found another exception for 
“true threats” of physical violence.49 The speaker in Watts was 
protesting the Vietnam War at a rally in Washington, D.C. He told a 
crowd, “I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first 
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”50 The Supreme Court reversed 
his conviction for making a threat against the President finding that 
the statement was political hyperbole and thus not a true threat.51 
Critical to the Court’s decision in Watts was the context of the 
statement, the expressly conditional nature of the statement, and the 
reaction of the listeners—the crowd had laughed in response.52 
D.  Virginia v. Black 
After its 1969 decision in Watts, the Supreme Court did not revisit 
the true threat exception until 2003.53 In Black, the Court defined a 
 
 44.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . . 
the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited 
areas.”). 
 45.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
 46.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69 (collecting authorities). 
 47.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 48.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 49.  Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (finding that a statute criminalizing 
threats against the life of the President was constitutional, but that “[w]hat is a threat must be 
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech”). 
 50.  Id. at 706. 
 51.  See id. at 708 (reasoning that “[the Court] must interpret the language Congress chose 
‘against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open’” (quoting New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding that a Virginia statute banning 
cross-burning was unconstitutional because it failed to distinguish between protected and 
unprotected speech). 
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true threat as a statement “where the speaker means to communicate 
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”54 The 
Court added that intent to carry out the threat is not required because 
the threat alone causes harm in addition to any violence that may 
follow. The words themselves are harmful. Therefore, a prohibition on 
true threats “protects individuals from the fear of violence and the 
disruption that fear engenders.”55 
In Black, the defendant led a Ku Klux Klan rally in an open field 
by a state highway and burned a twenty-five to thirty-foot cross,56 
which the sheriff was able to observe from the side of the road as cars 
passed.57 The defendant was convicted under a Virginia statute that 
criminalized burning a cross in public “with the intent of intimidating 
any person.”58 The same statute also provided that the public cross-
burning “shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.”59 
The Court held this “prima facie evidence” provision facially 
unconstitutional because it “ignore[d] all the contextual factors that 
are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning was 
intended to intimidate . . . [t]he First Amendment does not permit 
such a shortcut.”60 
E.  Circuit Precedent Before and After Virginia v. Black 
From 1964 to 1976, four circuit courts of appeals considered 
convictions under § 875(c),61 deciding, in the words of the Ninth 
Circuit, that “intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime.”62 
But, over time, this intent requirement fell by the wayside. Before the 
Supreme Court decided Black, the Third Circuit had ruled in United 
States v. Kosma63 that a true threat requires: 
[T]he defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in 
a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by 
 
 54.  Id. at 359. 
 55.  Id. at 344 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 56.  Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
 57.  Id. at 348–49. 
 58.  Id. at 348 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (West 1996)). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 367. 
 61.  See Brief for Petitioner at 25–26, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 
13-983). 
 62.  United States v. LeVison, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 63.  951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take 
the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of 
mistake, duress, or coercion.64 
Thus, the Third Circuit rejected a subjective-intent requirement 
for threats against the President and instead required proof that the 
speech was objectively threatening.65 Though Kosma dealt with 18 
U.S.C. § 871, in United States v. Himmelwright the Third Circuit held 
Kosma’s true-threat analysis also applies to § 875(c).66 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit have likewise upheld 
objective-intent standards. Those circuits considered Black and did 
not find the decision to require a subjective intent to threaten.67 Only 
the Ninth Circuit has found the true threats definition in Black to 
require that the speaker subjectively “intend for his language to 
threaten the victim.”68 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the prima facie 
evidence provision made the Virginia statute unconstitutional 
“because it effectively eliminated the intent requirement.”69 
III.  HOLDING 
The issue before the Third Circuit in United States v. Elonis was 
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black required 
proof of a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten for a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). If Black did so require, the decision would 
overturn circuit precedent that “a statement is a true threat when a 
reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted 
as a threat.”70 The Third Circuit held that Black did not alter its 
precedent,71 reiterating that this standard protects non-threatening 
 
 64.  See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable-
person test in accordance at the time with the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits). The Ninth Circuit currently uses a subjective intent test, which it set forth in 
the aftermath of Black with its decision in United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (2005). 
 65.  Kosma, 951 F.2d at 557. 
 66.  United States v. Himmelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 67.  See United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the Court in 
Black did not indicate “it was redefining a general intent crime such as § 875(c) to be a specific 
intent crime”); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (deciding that “the 
position reads too much into Black”); United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding the government does not have to prove a defendant’s subjective intent). 
 68.  United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 69.  Id. at 632 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 385 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 70.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 71.  Id. at 332. 
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speech while simultaneously addressing the harm caused by true 
threats.72 
The court concluded that Black was not dispositive because the 
Virginia statute required subjective intent to intimidate. Thus, the 
Court could not have rejected an objectively-threatening standard 
just by striking down the statute.73  
Regarding the Supreme Court’s general description of true threats 
as encompassing “those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,”74 
Judge Scirica, writing for the court, read the definition narrowly to 
mean only “that the speaker must intend to make the 
communication,”75 which he distinguished from an intent to be 
understood.76 
By extending the requirement to a subjective intent to threaten, 
the court reasoned, “speech that a reasonable speaker would 
understand to be threatening” would be protected and individuals 
suffering from “the fear of violence” and the “disruption that fear 
engenders” would not be protected.77 The court could not tolerate 
such a result. 
Finally, the court decided that the reasons Virginia’s prima facie 
evidence provision was unconstitutional did not disturb circuit 
precedent.78 The court contrasted the prima facie evidence 
provision—which the Black Court labeled an impermissible 
shortcut—with the reasonable-person standard, which includes 
considering context “to determine whether the statement was a 
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm.”79 Using this 
reasonable-person standard, the Third Circuit concluded that its 
consideration of the context of Elonis’s speech was sufficient to avoid 
the pitfall the Black Court identified. 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 329. 
 74.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 75.  Elonis, 730 F.3d at 330. 
 76.  See id. (“It would require adding language the Court did not write to read the passage 
as ‘statements where the speaker means to communicate and intends the statement to be 
understood as a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.’” 
(quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359)). 
 77. Id.(quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
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IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Elonis’s Arguments 
Elonis advances two arguments. First, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, he argues that the text of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires 
proof of a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.80 Second, he 
maintains that, without the subjective-intent requirement, § 875(c) 
criminalizes negligent speech, which would violate the First 
Amendment.81 Running through both of these arguments is a quote 
from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in United States v. Alvarez82: 
“mens rea requirements . . . provide ‘breathing room’ . . . by reducing 
an honest speaker’s fear that he may accidentally incur liability for 
speaking.”83 
Elonis argues that the plain meaning of § 875(c) requires proof of 
a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.84 Because the statute does 
not define the word “threat,” Elonis claims that it should be 
interpreted according to its “ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning,”85 for which he enlists the help of the Oxford English 
Dictionary,86 Webster’s New International Dictionary,87 and Black’s 
Law Dictionary.88 Each includes an intent component in the definition 
of “threat.”89 For example, Black’s Law Dictionary in 2004 defined 
“threat” as “[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on 
another.”90 
Next, Elonis contends that even though § 875(c) does not define 
“threat,” neighboring sections that also address the communication of 
threats include subjective-intent components.91 For example, Elonis 
cites § 876, which prohibits demands for ransom “with intent to 
extort.” Because Congress passed § 875(c) after § 876, and because it 
 
 80.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 22. 
 81.  Id. at 34. 
 82.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 83.  Id. at 2553. 
 84.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 22. 
 85.  Id. at 22–23 (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014)). 
 86.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 23. 
 87.  Id. Webster’s New International Dictionary in 1954 defined “threat” as “an expression 
of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means, esp[ecially] when effecting 
coercion or duress.” WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2633 (2d ed. 1954).  
 88.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 23. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (8th ed. 2004). 
 91.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 24. 
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did not expressly say it was removing a defendant’s subjective intent 
from the definition of “threat,” Elonis asserts that it was expanding on 
its earlier legislation. Therefore, “threat” kept its meaning.92 
From 1964 to 1976, four circuit courts of appeals determined 
“intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime” under § 
875(c).93 Elonis maintains that these cases were never overruled, but 
that, over time, circuits initially requiring showings of both subjective 
and objective intent began only using the objective test.94 
The last statutory-interpretation argument Elonis makes comes 
from a principle distinction between criminal and civil law in the 
United States.95 As the Supreme Court stated in Morissette v. United 
States,96 the criminal law requires actus reus and mens rea, a bad act 
and a bad thought.97 Injury alone is not enough.98 Elonis takes from 
this rule the canon that the “existence of a mens rea is the rule of, 
rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American 
criminal jurisprudence,”99 and argues that even if § 875(c) does not 
specify a mens rea, the Court should nonetheless “presum[e] that 
some form of scienter is to be implied.”100 Elonis maintains that 
Congress must explicitly dispense with such an intent requirement; 
because it did not do so when it passed § 875(c), the Court should 
read a subjective-intent standard into the statute.101 
As a First Amendment matter, Elonis argues that, without the 
requirement of a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten, § 875(c) 
criminalizes negligent speech, which is unconstitutional.102 Elonis 
begins with the rule “that content-based restrictions on speech be 
presumed invalid, and that the government bear the burden of 
showing their constitutionality.”103 The Court in Watts v. United States104 
 
 92.  Id. at 24–25. 
 93.  Id. at 25 (quoting United States v. LeVison, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
 94.  Id. at 26. 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 97.  Id. at 251. 
 98.  See id. at 250 (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.”) (emphasis added). 
 99.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 26 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600, 605 (1994)). 
 100.  Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994)). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 34. 
 103.  Id. at 34–35 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)). 
 104.  394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
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made an exception to the rule for “true threats” of physical violence.105 
But Elonis emphasizes that it is a limited exception, contrary to most 
First Amendment doctrine.106 
Elonis argues that the exception for true threats does not remove 
negligent speech from First Amendment protection.107 In the first 
place, there is “no established tradition of subjecting speech to 
criminal liability as a ‘threat’ absent a subjective intent to threaten; to 
the contrary, history suggests such an intent is a fundamental 
prerequisite to imposing liability.”108 Elonis cites encyclopedias, 
treatises, and Section 212.5 comment 1 of the Model Penal Code for 
the proposition that it was not an indictable offense at common law to 
make a threat if the only result was that it elicited fear in the 
listener.109 Some states passed laws criminalizing threats when the 
result amounted to disturbance of the public peace,110 but even then, 
Elonis contends, the threat “must be intended to put the person 
threatened in fear of bodily harm.”111  
Secondly, Elonis looks to the other types of speech for which the 
Court has deemed sanctions constitutional—including incitement, 
defamation of public figures, fraudulent fundraising calls, and false 
statements.112 Elonis claims that the Court has consistently required 
proof of a prohibited intent.113 For incitement, for example, the 
defendant’s “advocacy of the use of force . . . [must be] directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action.”114 For defamation of 
public figures, the speaker has to have acted with “actual malice.”115 In 
each example, Elonis asserts that, although the requirements may 
protect some harmful speech, the requirements ultimately “exist[] to 
allow more speech.”116 
 
 105.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 35. 
 106.  See id. (listing obscenity, defamation, and incitement as some of the few other areas 
where the Court has permitted content-based restrictions on speech). 
 107.  Id. at 36. 
 108.  Id. (applying Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2554 (2012)). 
 109.  See id. at 36–37. 
 110.  See id. (quoting 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 803 (Ronald 
A. Anderson ed., 12th ed. 1957)). 
 111.  Id. (quoting 2 WHARTON, supra note 110 (emphasis added)). 
 112.  Id. at 39. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 115.  Id. at 41 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)). 
 116.  Id. at 43 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (opinion of 
Kennedy, J.)). 
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Finally, Elonis argues that the Court’s precedent in Virginia v. 
Black established the “impermissibility of allowing liability for speech 
without proof of wrongful intent.”117 In Black, the Court described 
true threats as “encompass[ing] those statements where the speaker 
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an 
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”118 Elonis, emphasizing the word “means,” thus draws the 
Court’s attention to the speaker’s subjective intent to communicate “a 
serious expression,” unlike Third Circuit’s holding below—that the 
speaker only had to intend to communicate.119 
B.  The Government’s Arguments 
The Government makes both statutory-interpretation argument 
and First Amendment arguments. First, it argues that a subjective 
intent to threaten is not an element of § 875(c), and thus the statute 
only requires a mens rea of general intent.120 Second, it argues that 
“[t]rue threats, whether or not subjectively intended as such, lie 
‘outside the First Amendment.’”121 
The Government argues that the text of § 875(c) makes no 
mention of a subjective-intent requirement.122 However, it prefaces its 
statutory interpretation argument by rebutting Elonis’s contention 
that, without a subjective-intent requirement, speech would be 
impermissibly chilled.123 The Government narrows the purpose of the 
statute, stating that “[s]ection 875(c) reaches only ‘true threat[s],’; it 
does not reach jest, ‘political hyperbole,’ or ‘vehement,’ ‘caustic,’ or 
‘unpleasantly sharp attacks’ that fall short of serious expressions of an 
intent to do harm.”124 
It is a canon of statutory interpretation that “[w]here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act,” it does so purposely.125 Because the 
statute does not have an express mens rea element, the Government, 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)) (emphasis in original) . 
 119.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 120.  Brief for Respondent at 18, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-
983). 
 121.  Id. at 35 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 122.  Id. at 18. 
 123.  See id. at 21 (“A defendant is always free to explain his intention in making a 
particular statement, and a jury must weigh the defendant’s explanation of his intent.”). 
 124.  Id. at 19 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706–08 (1969)). 
 125.  Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation omitted)). 
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like Elonis, argues that one must be inferred.126 But, unlike Elonis, the 
Government urges the Court to infer a general-intent requirement,127 
as opposed to reading a subjective-intent requirement into the 
statute.128 The Government emphasizes that the statute’s neighboring 
sections expressly mention specific intent requirements, and thus 
Congress intentionally dispensed with such a requirement in § 
875(c).129  
The Government argues that Elonis’s proffered definitions of 
“threat” do not support finding a subjective-intent requirement in the 
text of the statute.130 Instead, the dictionary definitions Elonis cites 
better support understanding a threat as “the message that is 
‘express[ed]’ or ‘communicated.’”131 In other words, the Government 
insists that a threat is in the eye of the person threatened. In its brief, 
the Government gives the example of someone who receives a death 
threat in the mail: he would call it a threat, even if he did not know 
the sender or the sender’s intent.132 
The Government further argues that the purpose of the statute 
was to remedy the “undue narrowness of the existing specific-intent 
requirement for threat prosecutions.”133 Before Congress passed the 
predecessor of § 875(c), federal law prohibited sending threats with 
an intent to extort, and the Department of Justice asked Congress to 
supplement the law to make it “more flexible.”134 Accordingly, the 
Government concludes that the Court should interpret § 875(c) 
consistent with this request. 
The Government’s last statutory-interpretation argument is that 
reading § 875(c) to define a general-intent offense satisfies the 
presumption in favor of scienter.135 “The presumption in favor of 
scienter . . . ‘requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea 
which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise 
innocent conduct.’”136 For a § 875(c) conviction, all the defendant must 
 
 126.  Id. at 21. 
 127.  Id. at 28. 
 128.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 22. 
 129.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 120, at 23. 
 130.  Id. at 24. 
 131.  Id. at 25 (emphasis in original). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 27. 
 134.  Id. at 25–26. 
 135.  Id. at 28. 
 136.  Id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (citations omitted)). 
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know are the facts that make his conduct illegal.137 Thus, a speaker 
would only need to know that “he transmitted a communication and 
that he comprehended its contents and context.”138 In this way, a 
defendant would not be convicted “based on a fact . . . beyond [his] 
awareness.”139 
As a First Amendment matter, the Government argues that true 
threats fall outside of constitutional protection “because the harms 
that true threats inflict—fear and disruption[]—take place regardless 
of the speaker’s unexpressed intention.”140 Thus, the Government puts 
the focus on the statement’s impact on the listener, as “[a] statement 
that is threatening to a reasonable person has little legitimate 
expressive value.”141 To avoid the harm done by true threats, the 
Government argues that Congress can eliminate them as a mode of 
speech without infringing on the First Amendment.142 
The Government distinguishes a speaker’s subjective intent to 
threaten143 from the criteria listed by the Court in Watts. Whether a 
true threat exists depends on the statement’s “context,” its “expressly 
conditional nature,” and “the reaction of the listeners.”144 Citing 
Virginia v. Black, the Government additionally emphasizes that the 
Supreme Court has not yet finished defining the category of true 
threats.145 Combining its understanding of these cases, the 
Government argues that when the Court uses the word “encompass” 
in its description,146 it means that there can be other kinds of true 
threats, besides intimidation, for which conviction does not require 
proving a defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.147 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold that proof of a defendant’s subjective 
intent to threaten is required for conviction under § 875(c). Both sides 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 29. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 35. 
 141.  Id. at 36.  
 142.  Id. at 37 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)). 
 143.  See id. at 40 (“The Court did not look to the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.”). 
 144.  Id. (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). 
 145.  Id. at 41–42. 
 146.  “True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate 
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.” Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 147.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 120, at 41. 
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argue for the Court to read some level of mens rea into the statute. 
Importantly, it is unlikely in practice that instituting a subjective-
intent requirement, rather than the Third Circuit’s test, would result in 
significantly fewer convictions under the statute.148 And with little 
difference in outcomes, other factors should persuade the Court to 
affirmatively hold that conviction under § 875(c) requires proving 
subjective intent. 
The Government seems to fear that the subjective-intent 
requirement could allow a defendant to testify to an unexpressed, 
innocuous intent, and thereby avoid conviction. But in its own words, 
“[w]hat a speaker’s unexpressed intent cannot do . . . is convert 
statements that a reasonable person would understand as threatening, 
in context, into innocuous statements or merely letting off steam.”149 
The government means to forbid the use of an unexpressed intent to 
exculpate a speaker, but the word “cannot” more accurately means 
that it is impossible for any unexpressed intent to which the speaker 
testifies to automatically exculpate him. 
Concretely, even if a defendant testifies to an innocuous intent at 
trial, his subjective intent to threaten can be proven with evidence. 
This way, it is still left up to the jury to make a credibility 
determination, weighing the defendant’s stated intent along with any 
other evidence of his unexpressed intent in order to ultimately decide 
his subjective intent. Here, despite Elonis’s disclaimers in his posts 
and his use of parody and music, it is not impossible that he might 
have nonetheless been convicted upon a finding of him having a 
subjective intent to threaten his wife. Such a finding could be based, 
for example, on how he treated his wife in the past or what he told 
others about their relationship. 
Several factors weigh in favor of finding a subjective-intent 
requirement, and each will be discussed in turn. First, a hypothetical 
application of an objective test to the facts in Black shows that such a 
requirement would have disincentivized legitimate political speech. 
Second, balancing the obligations such a requirement would impose 
on the government versus potential speakers, the government would 
 
 148.  In addition to the reasons discussed here, Professor Kenneth Karst argues that the 
current law on true threats decides cases based on the specific facts before the court, and not by 
means of any strict adherence to precedent. He concludes this does not mean “surrender[ing] to 
lawlessness,” but rather just that judges will have to judge. Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and 
Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1411 
(2006). 
 149.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 120, at 21 (emphasis added). 
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have less of a burden in proving subjective intent than potential 
speakers would have in calculating their risk. Third, the Court’s 
general description of true threats in Black, although it is not binding 
here, can only be read grammatically such that the speaker must mean 
to “communicate” intent to threaten. 
A.  Hypothetical Application of Objective Intent to the Facts in Black 
The Government asserts that Black struck down a Virginia statute 
because the statute lacked a requirement that the state provide any 
amount of context. So long as an objective test involves some 
contextual investigation, then it passes muster under the First 
Amendment. But the facts of Black, viewed in light of an objective 
test, might still fail to differentiate between protected political speech 
and a type of true threat; this can be illustrated by applying the 
objective-intent standard from the Third Circuit as set forth in United 
States v. Kosma.150 In Judge Scirica’s words, “a statement is a true 
threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would 
be interpreted as a threat.”151 
In Black, the sheriff was able to observe the defendant burning a 
twenty-five to thirty-foot cross from the side of a state highway where 
cars were passing. If at least some of the Ku Klux Klan members at 
the cross-burning were “reasonable” and they were also aware of 
their reputation, then—to apply the Third Circuit’s objective-test—
they are guilty of making a true threat so long as they would have 
foreseen the cross-burning being interpreted as a threat. Next to the 
highway, some “reasonable” Klan members would have to have 
foreseen at least one passing car taking the cross-burning to be a 
threat. In essence, their reputation precedes them and all but prevents 
a jury from ever distinguishing political speech from intimidation. In 
this way, the objective test prohibits a group like the Ku Klux Klan 
from ever legally burning a cross in public, an issue that looks eerily 
similar to the one the Court spotted with the prima facie evidence 
provision.152 If, however, a subjective-intent standard applies, the jury 
would still be free to infer from the location of the rally that the 
defendant subjectively intended to intimidate, knowing passing cars 
 
 150.  951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 151.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 152.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (“The act of burning a cross may mean 
that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may 
mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech. The prima facie evidence 
provision . . .  blurs the line between these two meanings of a burning cross.”). 
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would notice the cross-burning. Thus, the cross-burner could still be 
convicted. An objective standard would have provided some context, 
but not enough to protect politically legitimate speech. 
B.  Balancing Obligations 
The Government’s contention that a threat, regardless of the 
speaker’s subjective intent to threaten, is harmful in its own right is 
reasonable but breaks down in application. Most critically, it raises 
alternative obligations. On the one hand, under an objective standard, 
a speaker has an obligation to foresee how his words may be taken, 
which, as Elonis points out, is increasingly difficult in the rapidly 
expanding universe of social media.153 On the other hand, the 
government can put on evidence to prove that a speaker subjectively 
intended to threaten the listener, and it would have to present 
evidence to meet an objective standard anyway. Thus, balancing these 
alternative obligations, the cost to the government is arguably much 
lower than to potential speakers.154 
C.  “Communicate” is Acting as aTtransitive Verb 
Finally, although it was not decisive in Black, the Court’s general 
description of true threats is exactly the kind of foothold the Court 
can use here to find a subjective-intent requirement. Again, the Court 
described true threats as encompassing “those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group 
of individuals.”155Judge Scirica argued below that the Court’s 
description in Black should be read only to require proof that the 
speaker intended to communicate. But this assertion does not make 
sense grammatically. The verb “communicate” could be taken to be 
intransitive, thus not requiring a direct object if it were at the end of 
 
 153.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 49–50 (arguing that the lack of “tone” and 
“mannerisms” on the Internet multiplies the potential for misunderstanding, and even 
emoticons, invented to add context, are subject to interpretation (quoting Kyle A. Mabe, Long 
Live the King: United States v. Bagdasarian and the Subjective-Intent Standard for Presidential 
“True-Threat” Jurisprudence, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 88 (2013))). 
 154.  Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 283, 316–17 (2001) (“Speakers will have difficulty telling in advance what will be 
construed as a threat by a jury, and therefore may be deterred from speaking even where their 
speech is not negligent.”). The article additionally criticizes the objective test for allowing the 
possibility for speakers to be convicted, “even where the speaker had no expectation that the 
alleged victim would hear the statement.” Id. at 288. 
 155.  Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
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the sentence. But, because the sentence continues and there is a direct 
object—“a serious expression of an intent”—and no other intervening 
verb to take responsibility for it, the most natural reading of 
“communicate” is as a transitive verb. The Court’s description, then, 
effectively translates to a requirement that a speaker intend to 
threaten. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Elonis was appropriate given 
ambiguous Supreme Court precedent. But now the Court will likely 
use this opportunity to establish a clear precedent and reverse the 
Third Circuit for three reasons. First, an objective-intent requirement 
would not have distinguished between permissible and impermissible 
speech in Black. Second, in most cases the government should be able 
to prove subjective intent as easily as proving an objective threat. And 
third, the most natural reading of the Court’s own description of true 
threats implies a subjective-intent finding. For these reasons, the 
Court will likely hold that a speaker must subjectively intend to 
threaten to be convicted under the statute. The Court will likely 
reverse Elonis’s conviction. 
 
